FACING A DEMOCRATIC EMERGENCY: The case for designating the BBC as Critical National Infrastructure
The UK is operating “in a space between peace and war,” with disinformation forming an “export of chaos” directed at this country. Blaise Metreweli, Head of MI6. December 2025
This is the last of a series of five papers by the British Broadcasting Challenge, in response to the British governments consultation on the future of the BBC. Paper 5 is The case to designate the BBC as Critical National Infrastructure.
Taken together the five papers set out an interlocking constitutional settlement for the BBC, addressing the structural weaknesses that have left it progressively less independent, less well-funded, and less equipped for the challenges it now faces. The author of the papers in Chris Waiting.
Paper 1: A Permanent Charter
Paper 2: A Board Fit for Purpose.
Paper 3: A Universal Licence Fee.
Paper 4: A Public Purpose for Technology.
Paper 5: The BBC as Critical National Infrastructure.
Paper 5, the case to designate the BBC as Critical National Infrastructure is below. The full document with all 5 papers is available at www.britishbroadcastingchallenge.com
Information Security: The BBC as Critical National Infrastructure
Executive Summary
Blaise Metreweli, Chief of the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) warned in December 2025 that the United Kingdom is operating “in a space between peace and war,” with disinformation forming an “export of chaos” directed at this country. The BBC is the UK’s most significant institutional defence: the most trusted news source by a factor of seven over any competitor, the most trusted international news brand, and the provider of the most-used fact-checking service in the country. Yet the current Charter does not recognise this function, and the World Service has been chronically underfunded since its transfer to the licence fee in 2014. We propose a new Public Purpose for the BBC relating to sustaining a healthy information environment, framed positively: the BBC builds the conditions for informed democratic participation, not policing the speech of others. We propose formal recognition of the BBC as critical national infrastructure for information security; the return of the World Service to full FCDO funding as a strategic national asset; and international partnerships with allied public service broadcasters to coordinate responses to transnational disinformation. With Voice of America effectively shut down, there has never been a more urgent moment to invest in the BBC’s global information security role.
The Problem
The world is facing what think tank Demos has termed a “democratic emergency“ (Demos, OurBBC: A Vision for the Future of the BBC, January 2026). Authoritarian states are emboldened, information warfare has become a central tactic of geopolitical competition, and the processes by which reliable information is produced, distributed and assessed are under systematic attack. [1]
The evidence is not abstract. False information spread after the Southport attack in July 2024 helped fuel riots across the country. Over two-fifths of UK adults report encountering misinformation or deepfakes, and nine in ten of those who do are concerned about their societal impact. The World Economic Forum ranks misinformation and disinformation as the top short-term global risk. Generative AI is industrialising the production and distribution of false content at near-zero marginal cost. The owner of X has predicted civil war in the United Kingdom and openly promotes far-right movements across Europe. And the current US administration has effectively shut down Voice of America, creating a vacuum in global trusted information that hostile actors are rushing to fill. [2]
The BBC is, by every measure, the United Kingdom’s primary institutional response to this environment. It is the most trusted provider of news in the UK: 49% of adults name it as the most trustworthy source, compared to 7% for the nearest competitor. It is the most trusted international news brand. BBC Verify is the most used fact-checking service among UK adults. The World Service reaches 418 million people weekly and is the most trusted international news provider, broadcasting in 43 languages from 75 bureaux worldwide. [3]
Yet the current Charter does not recognise the BBC’s information security function. There is no Public Purpose that addresses the health of the information environment. The World Service has been chronically underfunded since its funding was transferred from the Foreign Office to the licence fee in 2014, forcing the BBC’s global information security role to compete directly with domestic services for resources. The BBC’s verification, monitoring and media literacy capabilities are treated as discretionary activities rather than essential national infrastructure. The Green Paper itself acknowledges the threat, noting that the National Security Strategy identifies disinformation as a risk to social cohesion and proposing that countering misinformation and disinformation could become a BBC purpose. What it does not yet do is provide the institutional framework to make that recognition effective. [4]
Our Proposal
1. A new Public Purpose for the BBC on the information environment. The permanent Charter proposed in Paper 1 (Independence) should include a new purpose. We propose wording along the lines of: “To sustain a trusted and resilient information environment in the United Kingdom and, through the World Service, globally, supporting the public’s ability to access accurate, impartial information and to navigate an increasingly complex media landscape.”
This formulation is deliberately positive. There has been debate, including within our own group and among allied organisations, about whether the purpose should be framed as “countering misinformation and disinformation.” We have concluded that a negative framing carries significant risks. A purpose defined in terms of “countering” bad information could be read as charging the BBC with policing the output of other UK media, inviting the criticism that it is a government-backed “Ministry of Truth.” It creates a reactive posture, always chasing the latest threat rather than building resilience. And it could, in the hands of a less sympathetic future government, be exploited to direct the BBC’s editorial priorities. [5]
The positive framing does the same substantive work from a position of strength. The BBC builds and sustains the information environment through what it already does: accurate, impartial journalism at scale; specialist verification (BBC Verify); monitoring of global information flows (BBC Monitoring); and media literacy education (BBC Bitesize and other services). The Charter purpose recognises and resources this existing function. It does not create a new editorial directive. The safeguard is editorial independence itself: the BBC decides what is accurate, not the government. The permanent Charter and independent governance architecture proposed in Papers 1 and 2 are the structural guarantees that prevent misuse.
The BBC’s own consultation response confirms its support for updating the public purposes with “an explicit reference to media literacy and countering disinformation.” We welcome this. We believe the purpose should be positively framed for the reasons set out above. But on the principle that the BBC should have a formal Charter purpose in this space, there is no disagreement.
2. Recognition as critical national infrastructure. The BBC should be formally recognised as part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure for information security. This is not merely symbolic. It would bring the BBC within the scope of the government’s critical resilience framework, with corresponding protections and, potentially, access to the infrastructure funding that the 2025 NATO Summit committed allies to providing (1.5% of the 5% GDP security pledge for critical infrastructure and civil preparedness). The BBC’s own consultation response (A BBC For All, March 2026) cites the OurBBC report’s conclusion in full: “The BBC is therefore critical national infrastructure that provides a trusted backstop both at home and abroad. It is vital not just to our national identity and creative economy, but to our national security.” When the BBC itself publishes this language in its formal submission, the case for translating it into the Charter settlement is strengthened. The Charter is a Royal Prerogative instrument, not DCMS legislation. The BBC’s information security function sits at the intersection of DCMS, FCDO, the Cabinet Office and the security community. This cross-departmental reality should be acknowledged in the Charter settlement. [6]
3. Full government funding for the World Service. The World Service is one of Britain’s most effective instruments for projecting democratic values and countering authoritarian propaganda. It reaches 418 million people weekly. BBC users globally are more favourable towards the UK, more likely to think it has global influence, more likely to invest in the UK, and more likely to believe in democratic values than non-users. 76% of influential audiences globally have heard of BBC News, higher than any other British cultural export including British sport, film, and universities. The BBC has a plan that could extend this reach to close to a billion people within five to six years, depending on government investment. [7]
The BBC now has over 300 journalists operating in exile, a figure that speaks directly to the scale of the threat to press freedom and the personal risks borne by those who sustain trusted international journalism. And the consequences of retreat are immediate: within months of the World Service having to close its BBC Arabic radio channel in Lebanon as part of necessary cost savings, the Russian media company Sputnik began broadcasting an Arabic-language channel on the same FM frequency. Where the BBC retreats, hostile state media steps in. [7a]
The World Service was funded by the Foreign Office for the first eighty years of its existence. The transfer to the licence fee in 2014 was an austerity measure, not a policy decision. It created a zero-sum arrangement in which the BBC’s global information security role competes directly with domestic services for funding, weakening both. Full government funding should be restored, from the FCDO budget, recognising the World Service as a strategic asset for soft power, development and security. As Paper 3 (Funding) sets out, the Independent Funding Commission’s assessment of BBC financial needs should treat the World Service separately, with its own dedicated government funding stream. [8]
The strategic context makes this urgent. Voice of America has been effectively shut down. China spends between $6 and $10 billion annually on its state media operations. Russia’s RT had a budget of over $400 million before sanctions. The BBC World Service budget is approximately £300 million, part-funded from a declining licence fee. The asymmetry is significant, but so is the BBC’s advantage in trust and credibility. What is lacking is not capability but investment. The FCDO’s soft power and international influence priorities are directly served by a properly funded World Service; the government’s commitment to upholding democratic values internationally is undermined by chronic underinvestment in the institution best placed to project them.
4. International partnerships. The BBC should lead coordinated responses to transnational disinformation threats through partnerships with allied public service broadcasters: the EBU network, ABC Australia, CBC Canada, ARD/ZDF, NHK and others. The “middle powers” concept applies here as it does to the technology agenda (see Paper 4): individual public service broadcasters cannot match the resources of hostile state propaganda operations or platform algorithms, but collectively they represent a formidable network of trusted information. Shared verification tools, coordinated responses to disinformation campaigns, and common standards for AI-generated content should be developed through this network.
5. Algorithmic prominence. BBC and public service content must be algorithmically prominent on all major platforms. This is not about censoring other content. It is about ensuring that trusted, verified information is at least as visible as the most promoted content. The Media Act 2024 introduced limited online prominence provisions, but audience behaviour is moving faster than regulation. As Paper 4 (Technology) sets out, the Public Service Network and the broader digital infrastructure programme are the medium-term response; algorithmic prominence is the immediate regulatory requirement. [9]
6. Media literacy. The BBC should be given an expanded mandate and funding for media literacy education. In a world of deepfakes and AI-generated content, the ability to evaluate information sources is a core life skill. The BBC’s existing educational services, including BBC Bitesize, BBC Young Reporter and BBC Verify’s public-facing output, provide a strong foundation. The House of Lords Communications Committee (Media Literacy, 3rd Report of Session 2024--25) has recommended a more ambitious national approach to media literacy; the BBC is the institution best placed to deliver it. [10]
Evidence and International Comparisons
The evidence base for these proposals comes substantially from the government’s own sources. The National Security Strategy identifies disinformation as a threat to social cohesion. The Green Paper itself proposes countering misinformation and disinformation as a potential BBC purpose. The MI6 chief’s maiden speech in December 2025 placed information warfare at the centre of the UK’s security challenge. Ofcom’s research confirms that BBC Verify is the most used fact-checking service among UK adults, and that the BBC remains the most trusted source of news by a very substantial margin.
Internationally, the most instructive comparison is the United States, where the absence of a well-funded, universally available public service broadcaster has contributed to the fragmentation and polarisation of the information environment that many other democracies are now trying to prevent. Research across 17 countries shows that countries with stronger public service media tend to have higher levels of democratic knowledge, greater trust across the political spectrum, and more vibrant commercial media sectors. The BBC is not just a benefit to the UK; it is a model that other democracies are seeking to emulate or strengthen, not dismantle.
Anticipated Objections and Responses
“This turns the BBC into a Ministry of Truth.” The opposite. We are proposing that the BBC do what it already does, but with explicit recognition and adequate resources. The purpose charges the BBC with sustaining a healthy information environment, not with deciding what other organisations may publish. The BBC provides the trusted alternative; it does not police others. Editorial independence, guaranteed by the permanent Charter and independent governance proposed in Papers 1 and 2, is the structural safeguard. A future government that wished to weaponise this purpose would need to secure a parliamentary supermajority and the approval of the devolved legislatures to amend the Charter.
“The World Service is a luxury we cannot afford.” China spends between $6 and $10 billion annually on state media. Russia spends hundreds of millions on RT. The World Service costs a fraction of this and delivers outsized returns in influence and trust. It is one of the cheapest and most effective instruments in Britain’s soft power arsenal. With Voice of America effectively shut down, the vacuum in global trusted information is being filled by authoritarian competitors. This is not a moment to economise on information security; it is a moment to invest.
“Disinformation is too contested a concept for a Charter purpose.” This is precisely why the purpose should be positively framed. The BBC is not being asked to define disinformation or to adjudicate contested claims. It is being asked to build and sustain the conditions in which citizens can access reliable information and form independent judgements. The contested nature of the concept reinforces the case for a positive purpose, not a reactive one.
“Algorithmic prominence interferes with platform freedom.” Platforms already algorithmically promote content based on engagement and commercial interest. We are asking that trusted public service content be given at least equivalent prominence. This is regulation of distribution, not censorship of speech. The principle is already established in the Media Act 2024; the question is one of scope and enforcement.
“This is a DCMS paper; defence and security are not DCMS’s remit.” The Green Paper itself recognises the national security dimension. The Charter is a Royal Prerogative instrument, not DCMS legislation. The BBC’s information security function sits at the intersection of DCMS, FCDO, the Cabinet Office and the security community. The institutional framework must reflect this cross-departmental reality. [11]
Recommendations
1. The permanent Charter should include a new Public Purpose for the BBC relating to the information environment, framed positively. We propose wording along the lines of: “To sustain a trusted and resilient information environment in the United Kingdom and, through the World Service, globally, supporting the public’s ability to access accurate, impartial information and to navigate an increasingly complex media landscape.”
2. The BBC should be formally recognised as part of the UK’s critical national infrastructure for information security, bringing it within the scope of the government’s critical resilience framework, with corresponding protections and potential access to infrastructure funding.
3. Full government funding for the BBC World Service should be restored, from the FCDO budget, recognising the World Service as a strategic national asset for soft power, development and security. The Independent Funding Commission should treat the World Service separately, with its own dedicated government funding stream.
4. The BBC should lead the development of international partnerships with allied public service broadcasters for coordinated responses to transnational disinformation threats, including shared verification tools, coordinated campaign responses, and common standards for AI-generated content.
5. BBC and public service content must be algorithmically prominent on all major platforms. Ofcom should be given the mandate and resources to enforce this requirement effectively, extending the online prominence provisions of the Media Act 2024.
6. The BBC should be given an expanded mandate and dedicated funding for media literacy education, building on BBC Bitesize, BBC Young Reporter and BBC Verify’s public-facing output.
7. The Operating Agreement should specify the detailed scope of the BBC’s information security obligations, including BBC Verify resourcing, BBC Monitoring capacity, media literacy provision, World Service reach targets, and international partnership commitments. The Charter establishes the principle; the Agreement governs the specifics.
Notes:
[1] OurBBC Report, January 2026, pp. 10--12; V-Dem Institute, Democracy Report 2025.
[2] BBC written evidence to the House of Lords Communications Committee, 2025; Ofcom, Annual Report on the BBC, 2023/24; World Economic Forum, Global Risks Report 2025.
[3] DCMS, Britain’s Story: The Next Chapter (Green Paper and public consultation), December 2025, Chapter 2; National Security Strategy.
[4] DCMS, Britain’s Story: The Next Chapter, December 2025, Chapter 2; BBC, Global Impact and Influence Research, 2025.
[5] OurBBC Report, January 2026, pp. 34--35; see also the Demos Epistemic Security programme.
[6] BBChallenge, Background to the BBC Charter Consultation, February 2026, p. 6; BBC, Global Impact and Influence Research, 2025; 2025 NATO Summit Communiqué.
[7] See Paper 3 in this series (Funding), Recommendation 6.
[7a] BBC, A BBC For All: Consultation Response, March 2026.
[8] See Paper 4 in this series (Technology), Recommendations 1 and 3.
[9] DCMS, Britain’s Story: The Next Chapter, December 2025, Chapter 2.
[10] House of Lords Communications Committee, Media Literacy, 3rd Report of Session 2024--25, 2025.
[11] DCMS, Britain’s Story: The Next Chapter, December 2025, Chapters 2 and 4.